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I. Introduction
The quest for an "Index of social welfare" is an attempt to formalize a
system for comparing the total material endowments of all the individual members'
of a society. But such comparisons require the acknowledgment of explicit
rules or principles by which the true gains and losses which result from
different policies of economic growth may be evaluated. In the theoretical
literature, the arguments have taken the form of discussing the nature of
transfers and compensation, the tangencies of "objective" optimality or
efficiency criteria with some overall "normative" social criteria, and more
^ currently, an emphasis on the absolute state of the poorest member of a
^ society.^
Those concerned with economic development, however, had long held the
view that growth would also lead eventually to more equitable distribution
or that rising absolute income would itself compensate for any widening distri
bution of that income. Controversies have surrounded the very measurement
I
criteria of 'inequality": different measures measure different aspects of a
2
distribution, and the empirical results derived from time-series and cross-
section studies lend themselves to different interpretations.^ Does the size
distribution of income deteriorate with capitalist growth? What factors make
for a more egalitarian society during certain eras? Do the poorer countries
*Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, U.S.A. This paper is based on research
carried out initially at the Harvard Project for Quantitative Research in
Economic Development and then at the Yale Economic Growth Center. I would like
to thank H. Chenery, A. Figueroa, K. Mera, and T. E. Weisskopf for comments.
The author is solely responsible for the views presented here.
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today demonstrate a less equal distribution than do the richer countries as a
group?
Somewhat independent of empirical findings, development practitioners and
promoters have come to suggest that there may indeed be an unbreachable
contradiction between growth and equitable distribution. The supporting ele
ments for these differences were generally cited in the mechanism of the savings
propensities, the need to-accumulate out of personal income, and the relentless
impulse of the population to reproduce. But even this conventional wisdom is
being inverted: equitable distribution and growth need not be self-opposing;
indeed, capitalist growth is now to be seen as the hand-maiden of so-called
social justice,^ and a new crop of macroeconomic models have been designed to
trace the interactions of income-generation and income distribution. Policies
such as land reform, export promotion and import substitution are "simulated"
for their effect on family incomes; alternative distributions are "simulated"—
through revolution or tax policies--to trace their impact on aggregate income,
investment, consumption, imports and employment^. Nevertheless, the fundamental
the
question remains that of^connection between income growth and income distribution,
especially when the "unevenness" of the benefits received by different members in
different regions lies at the very essence of that growth .
This paper presents the results of applying several schemes for
evaluating social welfare in terms of the level of income to families and the
distribution of that income. Borrowing heavily on the early work of Mera (1967)
and Aigner and Heins (1967), I apply a set of measures to time-series and
cross-section data for several Latin American nations, sectors, and cities^.
The reader is forewarned that this author's own belief in the importance of equity
as opposed to efficiency is somewhat frustrated by the system applied and the
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results obtained here. To anticipate the conclusions, our measurement schemes
consistently reveal that'the gains in "social welfare" are the consequences of
the benefits of increasing aggregate efficiency which affect the losses due to
deteriorations in equality. This unsatisfactory finding may be due to the measure
ment technique and the traditionally narrow neo-classical criteria .on which they
are based. It is only in the hope that these criteria might be improved upon
and with the full and explicit recognition of their limitations that these
results are presented to the reader. Both the mechanical and philosophical
limitations of the criteria are outlined in the conclusions, along with some
indication as to the direction of their improvement.
' \
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II. The Social Welfare Function
At least two conventional avenues may be taken in the approach to neo
classical social welfare. The first is simply that the utility of individuals
in society is determined by the absolute level of income (or consumption) of
these individuals and that social welfare is simply the aggregate of individual
utilities. As the absolute income of all individuals rises, regardless of the
relative differences in their improvement, the overall social welfare of the
g
community also rises. An alternative approach adds that individual utility is
not merely a function of the one's own income but also of other members of the
society. It is the relative, not absolute, income which determines the level
of individual well-being, and social welfare is the summation of these inter-
9
dependent utilities.
In the system presented here, social welfare is a combination of both con
ventional approaches. Following traditional consumer theory, an individual's
income determines his utility independently of his relative position in
society. Social welfare, however, is determined jointly as the total sum of all
the individual utilities and by the equity inqillcit in the distribution of that
income. Social welfare is seen as apart from and somewhat "above" the individual
A deterioration in social justice could thus result from the differen
tial enrichment of a poor-but-equal society in which every member becomes
absolutely better off in a material sense relative to his "old" position.
Following Dalton, ^ equity is defined as the ratio of the "actual" social
welfare to the potential or achievable welfare given current resources.
(1) E- ^ W- actual welfare
W* = potential welfare
E. = equity ratio
The most ' equitable" society is that in which actual welfare approaches the
maximum potential welfare, and potential welfare is maximized when the pure
A-5-
egalltarlan ideal is achieved; that is, when all the members of a society receive
equal incomes. Thus, equity may be thought of as an index which expresses the
actual distribution of income, and actual welfare may be thought of as the
product of this equity measure and of the total income (efficiency) irrespective
of its distribution.
One common practice among development economists is their reliance on
income per head as a crude index of actual social welfare. A country
is thought to have "improved" under one alternative program if income has risen.
Equity is thus assumed to be neutral and does not enter into the calculus of
welfare. The adoption of an index of actual welfare which incorporates equity
as an explicit factor frees the evaluator from relying on simple efficiency as
the lone indicator of inq^rovement or failure of a development program.
Following the conventional neoclassical properties of a social welfare
function, both Mera (1967) and Aigner and Heins (1967) specify four general
properties:
1) that the social welfare function be measured in actual units which
can be compared between countries and regions, discountable over time,
and yield transitive and consistent ordering;
2) that the function be nondiscriminatory and indifferent to the ordering
of subgroups.
W(u^, u., Uj^, .... u^)
" W(U^, ..., Uj^, xiy ...,
where W = welfare function
Uj = utility of the jlk family.
3) that the social welfare function be bounded by zero at the lower tail
and that negative values are not admissible; and
4) that the function be continuous and that an increase in any individual's
utility contribute to an increase in total social welfare.
-6-
1^ ^0 (1 =1. 2 M)
Mera Imposes three further conditions. His welfare function must also be
5) dlfferentlable to the second order; 6) neutral with respect to the total
population size
W(u^) = W(Uj^, u^, u^) (i = 1, 2, M)
and 7) homogeneous of the first order,
XW = W(Xu^, Au^, Xuj_^) for X> 0.
One family of function which satisfies all the criteria takes the following
form:
(2) W =
M
lin )
i
1
q
(1 = 1, 2, M}
where: W = level of social welfare
= utility of the 1— family
NT = number of families in the society
q = parameter which may range from negative infinity to positive
infinity
The function takes on familiar meaning when ^ has integral values: of -l, 0,
and +1, for any array of cardinal utilities.
(3) ~ M^ "i ~ arithmetic mean function, when q = -1
^ 1
M
(4) W = (n u ) = geometric mean function, when 0=0
® i
(5) W = —= harmonic mean function, when q = 1.
i ^
In addition to the first four properties listed above, Aigner also requires
that the welfare function be twice dlfferentlable, but that the second deriva
tive with respect to a change in individual utility be negative. Aigner's
social welfare function does not satisfy properties (7) and (8) above, and is
therefore sensitive to the number of individuals and to the utility scale.
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One of Algner*s several functional forms is especially relevant to inter
national comparisons and is more sensitive to changes as.individual
incomes are raised above an arbitrarily-established threshold or a minimal
"poverty" line:
~ eu.
(6) W_ « I
^ i e + u,
(i « 1, 2, M)
where W = Aigner's measure of social welfare
f'hu^ = utility of the i— family
M =s number of families in the society
6 = parameter.
The value of the parameter, 0, is set by the evaluator to represent an
1
"acceptable standard" or "subsistence" level of living.
-8'
III. Properties of the Utility Function
The individual utilities which constitute the elements of social welfare
conform also to the conventional theoretical properties:
13
1) uniformity
"i ^ ^^^i^ (i = , M)
till
where is the absolute incon® of the i— family;
2) cardinality;
3) non-negativity (without which first-order homogeneity of social welfare
would not hold);
u^ > 0 (i = 1, M)
4) non-satiation or a positive marginal utility of income;
3u
^ > 0 (i = 1, M)3*1
5) second-order differentiability;
6) diminishing marginal utility with increments in income
<0 (i = 1, M) and
8x2
7) constant elasticity of utility with respect to income
^"i . ^1
T— ' — = Ti where n is a constant.
Of the seven conventional properties above, perhaps (7) is the least
acceptable. To the extent one believes in utility at all, we might expect the
elasticity of the utility of Income of the very poor to be significantly higher
than the elasticity of utility of the rich. Nor is Interdependence between
families admitted in the utility or social welfare functions.
One class of utility function which satisfies the above conditions takes
the conventional form:
•r9-
(7) (1 = 1, ..., M)
where = utility of the i— family, « income of the i— family, and
0 < n < 1.
Substituting a utilitjy function of equation (7) into the family of functions
given in equations (3)-(6), results in a series of welfare equations which are
maximizied when all the individual recipients achieve identical or equal incomes
The coresponding equity ratio, E, in equation (1) thus ranges from zero as the
least equal to unity as the most equal for each of the corresponding welfare
functions.
-10-
IV. Measuring Social Welfare
Comparisons of social welfare may be useful in evaluating the behavior of
different societies or of a single economy during the course of its development.
In the latter case, we should like to deflate the incomes from different years
to a common base year and, in the former case, to a single international currency.
Ideally, we should also deflate the incomes of individual recipients within the
same country by a price index relevant for the bundle of goods purchased by that
particular income class or geographical region.In practice, few of these
demands can be met, especially for a wide range of countries.
Since we are attempting international and intertemporal comparisons, as in
contraisting welfare for nations, regions, and cities, several adaptations of the
basic data are necessary. First, we shall calculate the equity ratio in current
prices on the basis of grouped income data by simply comparing actual to potential
social welfare. Such an index is uncorrected for differential changes in relative
prices for different income classes or regions in a given year or over time. But
once the equity ratio is calculated, however, the potential welfare (efficiency)
measure is then altered in midstream: the arithmetic mean of income is deflated
to 1960 and then converted to U.S. dollar purchasing power equivalents to
facilitate International comparisons. These G.D.P. per capita values expressed
in U.S. dollars at Latin American weights and indexed (U.S.A. = I'.OOO) are then
taken to represent country-wide efficiency, just as the equity ratio, calculated in
current terms, represents country-wide equity. It is the hybrid product of these
two measures—efficiency in constant international terms &equity calculated
from the current local distributions—that represents the value of actual social
welfare comparable for different countries in different years.
-11-
V. Results
A. Country-Wide Estimates
For eight different Latin American countries, the levels of equity,
efficiency, and social welfare may be conqjared for at least one year, and in
three of these countries for at least two different years.
The efficiency index (Table 1, column 1)—the measure of potential social
welfare is calculated as the arithmetic mean of national income in constant
1960 U.S. dollar equivalents. In Argentina, for example, real purchasing power
per capita rose from $786 to $927 or 18 percent in eight years (lines 1—2);
mean incomes in Brazil rose 33 percent between 1960 and 1970, and in Puerto Rico,
incomes rose 68 percent from 1953 to 1963.^®
Jl
In all the countries for which time series are available, almost all the
' measures indicate a decline in equity with a growth in income. For example,
geometric equity (E^) for Argentina fell from .759 to .735 (Table lA, col. 3,
lines 1-2), corresponding to a decline in its rank from eighth to sixth (least .
equal) of the entire san5)le (col. 12). Only in the case of the Fishlow data
for Brazil (lines 3-4), does the Aigner measure (E_ - col. 5) reflect a rise
R
in equity from .789 to .818, corresponding to a change in rank from second to
fourth place (col. 14).
The indices of actual social welfare, calculated as the product of effi
ciency (col. 2) and a corresponding equity index (cols. 3-6), indicate an almost
universal rise in welfare (cols. 7-10) and rank (cols. 16-19) over time. In
only two cases—the geometric and harmonic welfare indices applied to the
Fishlow data for Brazil (cols. 7-8, lines 3-4)—does actual social welfare
decline; only in these cases do the losses in geometric and harmonic equity
more than outweigh the gains in income. In all other cases, the growing income
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19offsets the declining equity.
In the cross-section sample of nine countries (ei^t from Latin America
plus the United States) which appear in Table IB, the rankings according to
the different equity measures (cols, 12-15) are generally similar to one
another. The geometric and harmonic equities differ slightly from each other
and from the Aigner and Gini indices. Although constructed in a. totally
different manner, the latter two measures yield almost identical rankings,
except in the cases of Brazil (Fishlow data) and Mexico, Likewise, the different
welfare indices for the sample of countries concur with one another except in
the case of the Gini welfare measure applied to Argentina and Costa Rica
(col, 19).
For the cross-section of countries, there appears to be a casual (untested)
. relationship between equity and efficiency. The three richest countries (USA,
Puerto Rico, Argentina) whose income ranges from $3,617 to $857 per head do
demonstrate higher absolute levels of equity than the other countries. Their
geometric equity ranges from .720 to .793 compared to a range of .477 to .601
for Brazil, Peru, and Colombia, the three poorest countries with Income levels
of $336-364 per head (Table IB, cols. 1 and 3).
The observation that richer countries may structurally demonstrate greater
equality than do the poorer countries is contradicted by the sparce time series
which suggest growing inequality within countries over time. (Compare Figures
lA and IB.) But even the impressionistic correlation of equity and efficiency
between countries should in no way be construed as indicating a likely future
path for a poor, unequal country. For example, it is inconceivable that the
growth path of Brazil as exhibited from 1960 to 1970, is related to or even
directed toward the "higher" iso-welfare contour which Argentina had achieved
by 1961.^°
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The location of countries on the welfare "mountain" in any given decade
should not be interpreted as indicating a pathway up that same mountain for
other countries in later decades. Such a "pathway" (the typical regression line
in cross-section studies) implies the replication of social conflict (the
process of income distribution) from one country to another. The statistical
procedures implied in such analysis, however, assume both independence of one
country's experience from another's as well as the constant and unrelated
variation of that experience (homoscedascity). Yet, neither the growth nor
equity of the Latin American economies, indeed, of all the so-called Third
World, can be seen as truly independent of the U.S. or of other industrial
economies, or, for that matter, of each other.
To the extent that these social welfare measures suggest a modification of
the so-called benefits believed to accompany the gains of growth by accounting
for the loss of equity, the measures may be only marginally superior to the
traditional use of average Income as a simplifying indicator. The bias
demonstrated above in which the gains of income growth systematically outweigh
the social loss associated with deteriorating equity is a bias perhaps inherent
In the formulation of the neo-classical criteria.
-18-
B. Social "Welfare "In Rural arid TTrbaii Zones
The general impression throughout Latin America is that the city, rather
than the countryside, is a much better place in which to live. Indeed, the
mean income alone indicates a standard of living in the city which ranges
nearly twice to three times the average in the countryside (Table 2, column 1),
21uncorrected for price differences.- Nevertheless, the cities are the scenes
of the,most inhospitable slums and desperate circumstances of human and sub
human existence as both poor and rich of the surrounding hinterland are drawn
into the horror and ecstasy of the modern Latin American city.
The ratios of urban to rural equity (Table 2, columns 2-5) almost universally
concur that the rural zohes are the more equal. Of the 32 ratios presented
here (four measures for each of eight observations), only 5 indicate greater
22equity in the urban areas.- The disparity in mean incomes dominates the
indices of actual social welfare (columns 6-9). As a result, the ratio of urban
to rural welfare varies from 1.06 for W in Colombia to 2.80 for W„ in Peru, un-
" H
corrected for price differences between regions. The overall averages for Latin
America (line 9) for each measure suggest that the urban zones enjoy nearly
twice the welfare of the rural.
The shares of Income which accrue to the urban population (Table 2, columns
summarize the overwhelming dominance of the urban zone in national life.
In Peru (line 6), for example, 43% of the population resides in the cities and
receive two-thirds of the national income. In the case of Mexico, the 56% of the
population which lives in the cities receives nearly three-fourths of the national
Income.
That "efficiency" is measured only in money terms and that the welfare index
is dominated by •• efficiency .-may bias the urban welfare rating. How
ever, by other standards, such as health. Infant morta.lity, housing, roads,
access to year'round food and to other services, the superiority of urban welfare
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may not be as decisive. The difference In money income alone does reflect the
state of development policy in these countries: that, in fact, growth in these
countries has been urban based and directed, disproportionately benefitting the
urban elites,
C. Social Welfare in the Agricultural aiid Nbnagricultural Sectors
While the division of the economy into urban and rural zones provides us
with some dimension of geographic welfare, an alternative division of the economy
into different producing sectors may provide us with a view of the contribution
of the underlying components to the overall behavior. Indeed, the changes in
equity and efficiency in the farm sector points to extraordinary pressure on
those who produce food and industrial crops. A traditional path to capitalist
development Implies a squeezing of the agricultural sector, the transfer of
value to other sectors, and a reduction in the basic cost of reproducing the
labor force throughout the economy.
Measures of efficiency and equity In the non-agricultural and agricultural
sectors are available for nine different countries and three of these have
data for more than one year (Table 3). The ratios of the average incomes
between the sectors affirm that the disparity between these two sectors ranges
from 1.13 in the case of Argentina for 1953 (line 1) to 3.51 for Brazil in
1970 (Fishlow data, line 5). The widening disparity between income means of
the two major sectors is also observed in Argentina, Brazil, Puerto Rico and the
U.S.A. (lines 1-2, 3-4, 10-11, and 12-13).
According to the ratios of the four equity measures (cols. 2-5), only the
cases of Argentina and the United States reveal that incomes are more equally
distributed in the non-A than in the A sector (as indicated by a ratio of greater
than unity, lines 1-2, 12-13.) In both Argentina and Brazil, the decline in
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this ratio over time for all the equity measures indicates a rapid deterioration
of equality in the non-A sector. Only in the case of Puerto Rico does a rising
ratio (lines 10-11) suggest a narrowing In tl;e differences of equity between
23the two producing sectors, (See Figure 2 for a sketch of the Puerto Rican case.)
The ratios of actual social welfare (Table 3, cols. 6-9) are all greater
than lonity and range from 1.19 in the case of harmonic welfare for Puerto Rico
in 1953 to 3.79 in the case of Gini welfare for Brazil in 1970 (Fishlow data).^^
The increase in the ratios of actual social welfare over time for Argentina,
Brazil, and the U.S.A. may be traced to the rising differences between the
productivities of the two sectors despite the declining equity ratios. Only in
the case of Puerto Rico did both the ratios of efficiency and equity rise.
The rising ratios suggest the severe internal differences between major
producing sectors and the division of each country into two very different
societies. If we slice these economies into either geographical (urban/rural) or
sectoral (non-A/A) divisions, then the widening gap in welfare between each pair
of these "internal" societies inay be seen primarily due to the widening disparity
in productivity and to minor differences in equity. But our interest should not
rest with observations as to the relative welfare levels and their trends.
Rather, we should inquiry further into the differences within each country:
why, despite the increase in overall social welfare, have not these societies been
able to guarantee acceptable levels of social welfare to families in all producing
sectors and zones?
D. Intra—Country Comparisons: Four Major Sectors
For Puerto Rico and Argentina, family income can be further disaggregated
Into the distributions generated by each of four major producing sectors for
each of two years and for Mexico in a single year." The measure of sectoral
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efflclency (Table 4, cols. 1-2: Indexed in cols. 7-8) indicate that the average
' * ' A
* .
family income generated by the commerce sector (III) enjoys a substantial
premium over Incomes generated in agriculture (I)which is ranked'lowest for all three
countries. In the cashes of both Puerto Rico and Argentina, this premium between
commerce and agricu-lture Increases in the later of the two yeails.
In terms of harmonic equity (E„ in cols. 3-4) the industrial sector (II)
11
ranks either third or fourth mo^t equal in all three countries (cols. 9-10)
diespite the different induetrial composition and social ^histories of the countries.
Commerce (III) ranks as the first or second least equal in all .three countries,
a finding consistent with the heterogeneous nature of that sector's activities
which range from petty coBitnerce to high finance.
Agriculture (I) demonstrates the least consistent equity ranking for the
three countries. In Puerto Ripp and Mexico, agriculture ranks close to industry
as the most equal of the sectors; in Argentina, however, agriculture ranks first
as the least equal of .sectors.
In comparing sectoral welfare between years and the ranking between
26countries , the contribution of the efficiency factor dominates the equity
factor (cols, 5-6^ 11-12), In both Puertq Rico and Argentina, for example-,
commerce (III)"and ^eryices (IV '^= reflept the highest level of social Welf^e,
while industry and agriculture the lowest. The debased ranking of agriculture
in all countries fop all years underscores' rural poverty and the backwardness
of policies affecting this sector.
The coiiq)arl8ons of social welfare highlight the increasing disl^armony and
stress within these economies. In Puerto Rico, for example, the difference
in actual social welfare, between commerce and agriculture increased from ,61 in
C
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-30-
1953 to 1.14 In 1963; in Argentina, the difference In social welfare between
commerce and agriculture increased from .45 to .70 from 1953 to 1961.
The relative and absolute movement of sectoral equity, efficiency, and welfaVe
are sketched in Figure 3 for Puerto Rico.
E. Comparisons Between Cities
In Latin America, economic growth has been closely associated with the
influence of the major cities in the commerical, industrial, and political life
of their societies. The great centralization of power and wealth in these
major cities, however, has not been accomplished without severe conflict;
Latin America's cities have frequently been the scene of great social upheavals.
The efficiency, equity and social welfare.^ of Latin American cities summarized
in Table 5, are comparable, as their incomes are converted into a common currency
equivalents. Incomes (col, 1) range from $350-450 per head for the poorest
cities (Recife, Call, and Barranquilla) to nearly $1000 per head for' the
wealthiest cities (SSo Paulo, Caracas, and San Juan). The least eqiial cities,
as indicated by the four equity measures (cols. 2-5) and their rankings (cols.
11-14) include Asuncion (Paraguay), the two Mexican cities and Medellln (Colombia);
the most equal include Guatemala, Caracas, and Sao Paulo.
The comparison of several cities within a given country provides further
evidence of the great disparities bet^ieen the cities themselves. For 'example,
the two Brazilian cities, Recife and Sao Paulo, rank relatively high in terms
of equity (lines 1-2, cols, 11-14), although Recife is the poorest of all the
cities in our sample and S3o Paulo among the richest (col. 10). Similarly,
the two Venezuelan cities demonstrate significant disparity between ,their
income levels: the per capita income for Maracalbo is $587 compared to
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$914 in Caracas, but their equity rankings are similar. Nevertheless, extreme
differences in levels of social welfare (see Figure 4) separate the two
Venezuelean cities. '
The average income for the four Colombian cities, uncorrected for differ
ences in regional price levels, rank Cali as the poorest, followed by Barranquilla,
Medellln, and Bogota, the richest. In terms of equity, however, Medellfn ranks
the least equal, followed by Cali, Bogota, and Barranquilla, Nevertheless,
the four cities are located in the same region on the social welfare map (Figure
4), as are the two Mexican cities, Mexico D. F. and Monterrey.
In summary, the Latin American city, itself the scene of great inequality
around a high overall income, is a microcosm of the wider development it
directs. The comparison of cities merely gives us glimpses of the range of
situations throughout Latin America. Earlier, we had seen evidence of the
greater equity associated with the rural as opposed to the urban zones, while
here we contrast the great cities and their consequences on welfare. Both
the product and cause of this style of capitalist development, the city remains
the conflicted island-volcano which flaunts its wealth above the vast seas of
rural poverty.
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VI. Conclusions
A, The Technique and Findings
This paper is an atteiiq)t to apply two schemes of measuring neoclassical
social welfare for countries, urban and rural zones, major sectors, and cities of
Latin America., Both schemes satisfy the conventional criteria which determine
the nature and shape of the individual's utility and the society's welfare
functions. Drawing on the family of mean value functions whose properties are
detailed in Mera (1967) and on another form described in Aigner and Heins
(1967), we estimate measures of equity for more than ninety different distri
butions and compare them to a form of the conventional Gini measure. The product
of each of these four equity measures and the efficiency index (level of per
capita income) is taken as a measure of actual social welfare.
We have found that these welfare schemes appear relatively insensitive
to the deterioration in equity which we have consistently observed during the
growth process and that the changes in efficiency dominate the measures of
social welfare. For exan^le, each of the four equity indices indicates a
widening of the income distributions for four countries over ten year periods
(Table lA), Nevertheless, the increases in efficiency proved sufficient to
offset these losses, at least in terms of the social welfare criteria applied
here.
We also indicated a fundamental contradiction plotting equity measures
against real income (Figures lA and IB): while each of the four measures
indicates a declining equity In the case of each country for which time-series
is available, the cross-section of nine Latin American countries suggests a
casual (untested) and positive relationship between equality and the level of
income per head! Despite the fashion among some economists who extend the
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promlses of "improved" equity over long periods of time despite short—run trends
to the contrary, my own inclination is to treat the international comparisons
much more cautiously.
To trace the course of social welfare for one country during a period of
time may be a meaningful exercise if one wishes to judge the gains and losses
of that process. But is there any point to extending welfare comparisons
between countries (Table IB) or between cities of different countries (Table 5)?
Is there any meaning in calibrating, for example, that the actual social welfare
of Brazil is one-quarter that of Argentina which is one-third that of the
United States? Indeed, if one desired to make this type of comparison, even
more heroic assunq)tions are required regarding the homogeneity of the individual
utility parameters across countries and of the comparability of their incomes.
Even if one desired to proceed with these assumptions, a structural model must
then also be specified which links the equity-generating mechanism with the
income-generating process. In this case, such a linking would have to explain
a positive relationship between these two processes on a long-term, international
basis and a negative relationship in the case of the short-run, time-series
findings. The short-run model would have to deal with the nature of the
struggle between social classes over their respective slices of the pie, while
the cross-section explanations would have to reflect such structural factors as
the nature of the exploitation of natural resources, commodity exports, and the
impact of their colonial history, as well as the consequences of such internal
struggles as those which concern organized labor, land reform, the armed forces,
and regional growth.
From the sample of urban and rural areas (Table 2) we have noted that
almost all the urban zones demonstrate less equality than the rural. Again,
the higher income levels dominate the welfare function and result in a higher
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urban score despite the lesser equality. The great absolute distance in
®f^iciency and welfare between the urban and rural reflects the internal cleavage
being built into these societies.
Splitting these societies another way, we also noted the great and
increasing disparity between thexincome levels of the nonagricultural and
agricultural (non-rA/A) sectors in a number of countries. , In all the countries
with the exception of Argentina, Mexico, and the U.S.A., the A-sector demonstrates
greater equality than the non—A sector (Table 3). In the four countries for
which time series are available, the distance between the non-A/A means
widened and with the exception of Puerto Rico^ the non-A/A equity ratio
diminished. The fall in this latter ratio was the result of the deterioration
in equity on the parts of both the non-A and A sectors, with a greater decline
in equity of the non-A sector for Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S.A. In
Puerto Rico, the apparent rise in the ratio of equity indices was the result of
the relatively greater deterioration in the A-sector than in the non-A sector.
Since the product of the A-sector (food and industrial crops) is a primary
determinant in the basic maintenance ^d reproduction cost of the entire people
and a source of raw materials for the other sectors, increasing disparities
between the equity and efficiency levels of these sectors suggests extreme
hardship for those working and producing in the A-sector. Indeed, these
observations reflect the growth path pursued by these countries, namely,
squeezing the A-sector £md widening the relative welfare benefits between
the two sectors.
In the case of the four sector divisions (Table 4) available for three of
the countries, we found agriculture to be the poorest but most equal sector
in Puerto Rico and Mexico, but in Argentina, agriculture was shown to be the
poorest and most unequal sector. The industrial sector was found to be
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relatively poor but equal in all cases, and the connnercial and service sectors
relatively rich and unequal. Again, these sectoral differences are but further
evidence of those changes which underlie the simple changes in the country-wide
distributions.
The findings from the sample of fourteen Latin American cities, which in
one sense may be taken as a subdivision of the urban zones, suggest that yet
further and profound differences exist within the relatively wealthy areas of
the poor countries (see Table 5). Great disparities in income levels are
particularly evident among the cities of Venezuela and Brazil, The two Ifexican
and four Colombian cities are more similar in terms of both equity and
The time series for San Juan, Puerto Ricoj indicates a rise in both
equity and efficiency from 1953 to 1963, and hence a massive deterioration in
equality for the rest of the country, since the country-wide distribution as a
whole grew less equal. The Latin American city, compared to its hinterland,
may be both the prime-mover and beneficiary of this style of economic development
The application of the schemes of social welfare presented here could lend
itself to the following type of conclusions: "Yes, we have suffered a deteriora
tion in equality," concedes the development economist, the high priest who
reads the signs of the social welfare function. ^ "As you have suggested, any
conclusion about equity may be sensitive to the measure selected. We have
therefore applied different measures here consistent with your welfare criteria,
"But see how we've grown! By the very social welfare criteria you
propose, which is acceptable to us to measure these forces, net social welfare
has increased. By the very standards you impose on us, we have pursued that
path which has yielded increases in social welfare and that has rewarded growth-
even at the cost of minor losses of equity^ which we can correct sometime in the
near future."
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I believe such an interpretation to reflect an unfortunate use of the
neoclassical welfare function which is, nevertheless, widespread in thinking
and practice. A "technical," apolitical group of evaluators select themselves
within a "formally democratic framework" to be the "*bearer* of the social
28welfare function," How ironic it is that this view of social welfare which
embodies the extreme" egalitarian ideal should become fashionable in capitalist
societies characterized by extreme inequaltiy! This egalitarian ideal may, in
fact, be used to cloud the fact of extreme and increasing inequality in the case
of the countries examined here. Is social welfare the state-bome legitimizer
29
of the path taken?
We are urged not to be so harsh. After all, some of the equity measures,
we are reminded, are extremely sensitive to the plight of the poor. Besides,
the situation could even be worse in the absence of public subsidies and
benefits, such as welfare, national defense, police protection, public highways,
etc. "It is the modern-day analogue of Aquinas," writes one economist in his
analysis of the tax iii5)lications for achieving Rawlsian social justice.
"Everything for the greater utility of the poor."^® Equality becomes an
aesthetic taste," in the words-of another public finance expert, "similar in
31nature to a taste for paintings." Thus, a benefit-cost rationality becomes
applied to equality, and the social welfare function serves as the guide.
Seen another way, the productive system generates inequality. The state is
called upon to take steps to "reidistribute" income or consumption in order to
prevent excessive damage by the unemployed, the hungry, or the "criminal"
elements. To bourgeois society, social welfare and equity are viewed in their
reduced form: the degree of desperation of the poor and the ostentatious
preferences" of the rich, be they preferences for goods, services, liberties,
or for equality itself.
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But how was the inequality (poverty, wealth, crime) created in the first
place? A peasant earns $1 per day and then receives a "redistribution" which
raises his income to $1,02. But how was .the $1 determined in the first place?
What is the nature of the policy and power which systematically denies an even
larger share to the peasantry and also creates the urban beggar and rural migrant?
This paper has touched on none of these important questions. Our results
yield more statistical silhouettes of the process, of increasing income levels
and deepening inequality. In one sense, these countries may have avoided the
whole equity question by relying on growth to ease social tension. Yet the very
path of capitalist growth creates the inequities and enhances internal
disparities.
The same question may be approached from a slightly different angle: can
a country set aside the obsession with growth and improve social welfare by
altering the distribution of income? Thus, Argentina (Table lA, line 1) grew
18% in real per capita terms from 1953 to 1961 while geometric equity declined
3A, Could not the society^s welfare have inq)roved as much by improving equity
15% with no growth? In this context ^ our attention is called to one Latin
American nation which has left the capitalist path and has embarked on economic
policies to correct for decades, if not centuries, of growth and inequity. A
careful examination of the changes in its distribution may reveal that despite
some stagnation in the aggregate income level which has been the consequences
of, embargo and the reorientation of her trade, this island-people has achieved
substantial improvement in social welfare, even by neoclassical criteria.
This type of thinking—trade-offs, alternative paths, in short, using the
welfare function to evaluate possible programs—all this still takes place
within the fantasy-world of imaginary choice. In reality, there is little to
choose from. The "development" drive which cott^iells a country towards aggregate
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growth at the expense of equity is hardly a movement to be slowed by other than
a perfunctory consideration of social welfare.
Technical and Philosophical Problems of Social Welfare
We turn now to two further categories of qualifications relevant to the
welfare schemes applied here. The first deals with the technical aspects of
the functions; the second deals with some broader philosophical criticisms of
the very concepts we have sou^t to n^asure. In the first category, we have
already noted the absence of such factors as price corrections applied to the
incomes received by different social classes which would be preferable to the
slii5)le deflation of incomes by a single "price index" applied to all categories
of goods for all classes. Nor has any provision been made for the consumption of
public goods or services or for collective consumption of any sort. This type
of adjustment might heighten the already strong urban-rural differences or the
considerable disparity between major producing sectors.
A more formidable technical qualification deals with the assumption of
unity for the elasticity of the utility of income which, in our calculations,
had been set constant at its upper permissible limit. Mera (1967) suggests a
more realistic figure which ranges from .80 to ,95 on the basis of measurements
of data from the U.S., Canadajand Japan.it might be more realistic to allow
for an elasticity which declines as income rises for a given society, the
notorious stinginess and greed of the rich notwithstanding. The elasticity
Itself may vary as well between countries as a function of the basic Income
level, the degree of exposure to the richer countries, or of self-reliance
A «
and inward-orientation.
The more philosophical objections to neoclassical social welfare include a
note that the usual conditions for Pareto optimallty are violated in the welfare
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comparisons over time by the reality of social mobility* As long as some groups
are downwardly mobile, then technically we are at a loss to compare the before-
and-after states. Even if all incomes rise, as in Puerto Rico between 1953 and
1963, the individuals whose incomes rise are not the same ones as the formerly
poor; the locations of all the players in the distribution have not shifted
uniformly upward. The comparison of the two time-snapshots of a society, one
taken prior to the increase and one afterward, it is said, can lead to a finding
of "higher" actual welfare only if the "losing" groups are compensated. Such
compensation is usually carried out mentally, if at all. The subsidies remain
imagina.ry. Real deprivation, either absolute or relative, lies at the heart of
the growth process.
Gintis (1972) adds that the assumptions of constant preferences is violated
as income rises. Increasing income can very well leave an individual worse
off since .the very process of consuming the new bundle changes the individual's
35
preferences."
This criticism of neoclassical welfare economics is especially relevant to
the Latin American countries since the pattern of economic development is
tantamount to introducing "revolutionary" habits and tastes through new objects
and their associated cultures, such as the auto, electrical appliances, synthetic
textiles, drugs, in short, a new style of living which looks, feels and smells
36
strikingly American.
Gintis argues further that an extended or complete vision of social welfare
depends not so much on the actual quantity of consumed goods and services, but
on the "path of development of the individual's capacities for undertaking
activity." In capitalist society, new techniques are introduced to reduce costs,
not to enhance an Individual's welfare, well-being, or job-satisfaction.
Motivation is sustained through material benefits—through access and exposure
to new commodities, and the consumption of these commodities then influences
-45-
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new preferences and capacities. There Is no necessary relationship between
jobs which yield higher incomes, on the one hand, and higher competence,
satisfaction, or individual development, on the other. On the contrary, "new"
jobs usually spell a further extension of the technical division of labor, a
simplification of work content, and the decomposition and degradation of labor
skills.
Nor have we admitted other social, nonmaterial qualities to be elements
in our welfare evaluation, such as the moral and ethical dimensions, the social
relations which characterize a society, its manner of caring, of sharing and of
serving its own people. Nor have we emphasized, except in passing, the inherent
incompatibility between efficiency and equity once the system is dynamized.
Increased equity under capitalism opposes efficiency. In its simplest manifes
tation, the centralization of power, the growth of the capitalist city, the
emphasis on luxury production and consumption, in short, the rejection of equity
on every level, is the conclusion of the forward movement of the process. To
infer broad "welfare" propositions from the very barest skeletal structures
for a particular society in but one short stage of its evolution, violates the
broader charter, of human concern, although such conclusions would be perfectly
consistent within the comnuDnplace neoclassical paradigm.
In concluding, therefore, we reject the notion of the state as the bearer
of the social welfare function, for only a people can express by what standard
their misery or satisfaction should be judged. We reject as well the notion of
a trade-off between equity and efficiency implicit in the very functional form
we have applied in the empirical study. Finally, we are forced to qualify
almost every aspect of the already narrow elements of social welfare tested here.
This investigation may have told us something of the degree, shape, and nature
of the inequities observed in the growth process. Not only do these findings
I *
I
-46-
challenge us to extend our Ideal of social welfare, but they also drive home the
immediacy of altering those institutions which Inhibit our realization of that
ideal.
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Footnotes
^See de V. Graaf (1967) and Phelps (1971).
2
See Dalton (1920), Gini (1921), Elteto and Frigyes (1968), Atkinson (1969),
Levine and Singer (1970), and Chaiq>emowne (1974).
3
On enqjirlcal findings see Kuznets (1963), Weisskoff (1970), Robert! (1974),
Weisskoff and Figueroa (1976), and Ahltiwalla (1976).
See, for exanq>le, Chenery, et al. (1974).
^See Cllne (1972), Adelman and Robinson (1975), Weisskoff (1976), among others
g
See Hymer (1972) and Mera (1975).
^To my knowledge, the original Mera (1967) paper has not been published,
although his work has eventually seen aspects independently derived by Atkinson
(1969) and Chaii5)ernowne (1975), I first applied Mera*s scheme in Weisskoff
(1969) arid have since e:q)anded the sample.
g
See de V. Graaf (1967), especially Chapter IV, "Potential Welfare."
^See Thurow (1971).
^%alton (1921), p. 349.
^Mera (1967), p. 36ff. tests the function for each of the above properties.
He notes that the CES production function (p. 45, n. 1) is also of this same
family of functions. See G. H. Hardy, et al., (1959), Chapter II, "Elementary
Mean Values" for proofs.
12
Aigner (1967), p. 16. Note that;
K = ^
^ i 0
hence the increment to social welfare is much greater for a given utility distributed
to families close to or less than the threshold than if the same utility were
received by wealthier families, Aigner uses 0 = $5,000 for estimating welfare
of U.S. states. Our choice of 0 is explained in Section IV, n. 16.
•As
ia'Mera (1967), pp. '26-31, uses consuii5)tion rather than income as the
determinant of utility.
14
Mera (1967), p. 32, and Aigner (1967), p. 14, perform identical proofs.
Both maximize the social welfare function W(u^, Ujj)» where u^ = f(x^)
subject to the income constraint that
2 = X,
1
where Xis the total national Income and x^ is the Income of the 1— family.
Setting the first derivative equal to zero yields x^ = X/M for all individuals.
Second order conditions specify the form of the utility function. Aigner never
places conditions on the utility function. However, by entering "untransformed"
Income directly as utility, he has in^)licitly adopted n = 1 of equation (7)
above.
^Dalton (1920) en^hasizes the need for domestic purchasing power equiva
lents as well for domestic comparisons in n. 2, p. 356. Conclusions regarding
the real inqjact of observed changes in money income received by different
groups over time may be qualified by the effects of changing relative prices.
Real purchasing power differences may be most important in the urban-rural and
regional conq)arisons of welfare,
Dalton favors the use of the ratio of the logs of arithmetic to geometric
Income Instead of the untransformed ratios such as those used here because,
he writes, "proportionate additions or subtractions will leave inequality
unaffected. An equity ratio of the untransformed means, he wrote, is "a
distinct, and inferior, measure...not a mere simplification" of his log-
transformation. See Dalton (1920), n. 1, p. 356.
The choice of the arithmetic mean function as a measure of actual as well
as potential social welfare, it should be noted, does reflect a theoretically
acceptable welfare function, which, in effect. Ignores any change in the
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distribution of income and corresponds, to the practice of implicitly equating
per capita Income to welfare.
Aigner's measure, W^, of equation (7) deserves further connnent. Like the
other measures, W* is maximized if each family were to receive the identical
income. But the measure is more responsive to changes in those families whose
income is close to the parameter, 0, than to changes in the incomes of families
more distant from the established parameter.
Aigner's welfare function, W , of equation (6) is estimated as:
K.
W = Z
0 ?x. . f(x.)
-1 r
(0-Hx^) j = 1, M.
where 8 = an arbitrary parameter. For Puerto Rico, 0 was set at $2,000, to
correspond to the "minimum acceptable standard" of living described in the
Puerto Rico Governor's Report (1964), p. 41ff. For other countries 0 was set
at three-fourths the average income in national currency.
The geometric mean function is estimated as:
= antilog { f(x ) log x } j = 1, 2, m'
j J , J
where M= total number of families; N= total number of income-brackets;
Z f(x.) = sura of weights; x. = average income of families in the j— income-
j ^
bracket; = number of families in the j— income-bracket. The harmonic
mean function is estimated as:
W^ = M 2 ; ^
X.
J J
j = 1, ..., N.
^^Time series comparisons may be capturing cyclical as well as growth
effects. See Weisskoff (1970).
For Brazil, two different estimates are available which refer
to the same years. We present both to the reader (Table lA, lines 3-4 and 5-6;
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Table IB, lines 2 and 3).
18
Real incomes are indexed to the United States average of 1960-62 so that
efficiency as well as equity might vary zero to tinity. Despite this diminution
of the efficiency scale,•changes in the index of social welfare are still
dominated by the changes of the arithmetic mean and not of the equity factors.
The equity indices (columns 3-6) vary from zero (the least equal) to
unity (perfect equality). The Gini coefficient, a conventional index of
inequality, which normally varies from zero as the most equal to unity for
extreme inequality, is here (col. 6) subtracted from unity to be coi]q)arable
to the other measures. The Gini ratio and its corresponding welfare index
do not meet the neoclassical welfare criteria outlined above, but we include
it here to facilitate coii5)arison with the other "specialists" equity
measures. See Atkinson (1969) and Champernowne (1974).
19
In the case of the Fishlow data for Brazil, the Gini welfare index
indicates no change at all (.049) between the years 1960 and 1970.
20
The plotting of efficiency and equity on the iso-contour map (as in
Figure lA), indicates the movement of Brazil (Fishlow data) toward a lower
iso-welfare line from 1960 to 1970, while the other observations for Brazil
(Langoni data), for Argentina, and for Puerto Rico, indicate a downward
(loss of equity) and ri^tward (growth of income) movement resulting in
a "net" rise in welfare, as calculated by these indices.
For further discussion of the pooling of time-series and cross-section
data for developing countries and the testing of between- and within-country
effects, see Weisskoff (1971).
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2l
Due, for example, to differences in the cost of living or for income
in-kind. Rural incomes may thus be underestimated consistently, but certain
industrial prices are higher in the rural zones. No adjustments of the original
data sources have been made here.
22
These are harmonic equity (E ) for Peru and 1963 Puerto Rico; Aigner
n
equity for Colombia and 1963 Puerto Rico; and Gini equity (E^ Gini^
Colombia.
23
In the United States, these ratios prove relatively stable during this
period although the divergence between the sectoral means increased.
24
Since the inter-sectoral welfare ratios are calculated as the product
of the ratios of efficiency and equity, and since no corrections have been
made on the efficiency measure for purchasing power differences between sectoral
incomes, the welfare ratio themselves reduce to the ratios of the simple equity
measures.
25
Manufacturing includes mining and construction. Commerce includes
retailing, wholesaling, and finance. Services include a broad range of activities,
such as transport, communications, public administration, public utilities,
and professional services.
26The efficiency indices in Table 4 for Puerto Rico and Argentina are
estimated in constant prices for each national currency. Thus, the absolute
welfare measures are comparable between years and sectors for each country
but not between countries.
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He might even cite Champernowne's warning (1974) p. 807:
This suggests that the choice of index could quite frequently
decide the answer to such questions as whether inequality had
increased or decreased in a country over a decade. In making
the choice one should accordingly be very clear in what type
of inequality one is primarily interested.
28
The quotation is from Gintis (1972) p. 597, n,9, who adds,
No such practical obfuscation is possible in the theory
of the firm, as the present political structure of the firm
(bureaucratic order and hierarchical control) is totalitarian
in the pure political sense.
29
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
and sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth;
Then took the other
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
Yet knowing how way- leads on to way,
I doubted if I should ever come back.
And that has made all the difference.
—Robert Frost, "The Road Not Taken."
30
See Phelps (1973), p.333
31Thurow (1971), p. 327, makes equity a term in the individual utility function.
Individuals who "prefer" positive equity might also be willing to pay for a more
equal society through taxes or charity. The benefits may range, according to
Thurow, from greater political stability to a reduction in the number of paupers
and rapists in the city strets.
32 What are the empirical effects of the income distribution on crime, social
stability, political stability, or any other characteristic of [capitalist] society?"
Thurow (1971), pp. 335-6, concludes agnostically. "We just do not know."
33See Mera (1967), p. 34. The empirical findings are related in Mera (1968),
pp. 120-22.
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34
Firsch (1959), p. 188-89 cites Johansen's method for demonstrating the
variation of money flexibility (elasticity of the marginal utility of income)
by income class for Norway. This method is also reported in Johansen (1964).
Frisch writes, "It would be a very promising research project to
determine o) for different types of populations. A universal 'atlas* of the
values of to should be constructed. It would serve an extremely useful purpose
in demand analysis."
Applying a single own-price elasticity for food from a pooled cross-section
of sixteen low-income countries (Weisskoff, 1971) to the food budget share and
expenditure elasticities obtained from purely national data, I have estimated
"national" money flexibilities which vary from -.87 for Nairobi, -.93 for Israel,
-1.44 for Ireland, -1.77 for Puerto Rico, and -1.82 for Mexico. By applying
expenditure elasticities and budget shares estimated for different income classes
within Puerto Rico to a single overall price-elasticity, I have found that Firsch's
money flexibility falls in absoulte terms from -2.55 for the lowest class to -1.29
for the highest income group.
The provision for the variation in the elasticity of the utility (or marginal
utility) of money would necessarily affect the international and intertemporal
comparisons of cardinal welfare calculated for the Latin American countries and
any conclusions drawn from these findings.
^^Gintis (1972), p. 528.
36The process of "import substitution" in Third World countries may be seen
as the post-war reorientation of these nations' industries toward the style of mass
consumption living which first became popularized in the US. in the 1920's. In
smaller countries whose home market is believed too narrow to support local
production, the success of "export promotion" (and sometimes its variant, "export
substitution") guaranties the necessary foreign exchange to sustain the direct
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imports of these newly-desired contrivances. In Latin America, the process of
import substitution has been most complete in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, while
export promotion has been the historic pattern in the Caribbean, especially of
industrial manufactures in Puerto Rico,
37
Gintis (1972), p. 587-8 concludes:
Thus a correct extension of neoclassical welfare economics
recognizes that individual welfare depends on the unit-objects
[social entities] available, as well as on his/her pattern of
individual development; that unit-objects occur in alternative
"feasible" bundles...; and that changes in the structure of economic •
institutions produce changes in the patterns of feasible unit-
objects and the constellation of compatible paths of individual
development.
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